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ow do we know that other people are conscious? 
This “problem of other minds” has traditionally 
been answered by citing others‟ behavior, for the 
power of the intentional stance to predict and 
explain human behavior is unrivaled by any other system of 
explanation. I will argue, however, that the traditional solution 
succeeds only insofar as consciousness is conceived in terms of 
functional relations. If consciousness is conceived in terms of 
intrinsic, ineffable, indescribable qualitative states, the problem 
of other minds is unsolvable. Not only does the behavior of 
others fail to prove that they have qualia, it provides no evidence 
whatsoever for that contention, and neither does any other 
argument. Consequently, I will argue, we ought to conceive of 
consciousness in purely functional terms. 
 I will begin by stating some assumptions. First, I will 
assume that we are able to describe, predict, and explain, a great 
deal of others‟ (and our own) behavior in terms of mentalistic 
categories: beliefs, desires, feelings, and so on. That is, Dennett‟s 
assertion that taking the “intentional stance” yields predictive 
and explanatory power not available by any other known 
method (Dennett 1987) is correct.1 Furthermore, I will assume 
that the categories of the intentional stance are good enough that 
a future theory of psychology will not abolish folk psychology, 
contrary to Paul Churchland‟s thesis (Churchland 1981). (If it 
didn‟t, „how do we know that other people are conscious?‟ 
would be an empty question. One can only know things that are 
true.) 
 The first characteristic of the mental that I would like to 
consider is our ability to use the intentional stance. Now, if the 
intentional stance works in the deep way I am supposing it does, 
then we can treat folk psychology as a largely true (but 
incomplete) theory of the behavior of people.2 The theory of folk 
psychology, unfortunately, does not provide us with 
exceptionless universal laws: at best we get rough-and-ready 
generalizations, but such lack of rigor is hardly a deathblow to 
the theory. Insofar as it is such a theory, it can be treated as a set 
of relations between observables (behaviors, etc.) and mental 
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states, so that being in a certain mental state provides 
dispositions to certain actions and to other mental states. In other 
words, mental categories are useful for prediction and 
explanation because we can treat them as functional categories. 
 
OBJECTION: Why should we believe that mental categories are 
functional categories? 
REPLY: Suppose we could not treat mental categories as 
functional categories. Then mental states would not provide 
dispositions to behaviors, or they would not provide dispositions 
to have other mental states. If this assertion were true, we would 
be unable to use them to predict others‟ behavior and mental 
states, which we are obviously able to do. Conversely, suppose 
that in addition to treating mental categories as functional 
categories, we need to consider some of their other properties in 
order to predict and explain the behavior of others using the 
intentional stance. But (by hypothesis) the functional 
characterization of mental states contains all the information how 
they cause dispositions to behavior, so no other quality of the 
state can be necessary in order to predict behavior. What of 
explanation? A characteristic of mental states that was useful for 
the explanation of observable phenomena, but that did not 
(ceteris paribus) explain that those phenomena were more likely 
than other phenomena would be no explanation at all! I 
conclude, therefore, that insofar as mental states are relevant to 
the prediction of observable phenomena such as behavior, they 
are relevant in virtue of their functional properties. 
 
OBJECTION: Yes, the mental concepts of folk psychology do 
provide dispositions to behavior and other mental states, but 
why should we believe that they do this in a way that can be 
described as functionalist? 
REPLY: Once we have established that the mental states of folk 
psychology provide dispositions to behave in certain ways and 
to have other mental states, we have established that folk 
psychology can be described functionally. The functional states 
of the theory are mental states, the outputs are behaviors, and the 
inputs are environmental stimuli. 
 Nonetheless, we cannot at present describe folk 
psychology as a functional theory. That is, we know how to 
apply folk psychological concepts, but not how to explain their 
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use (at least not very well). The development of such a 
description would require a substantial joint research program in 
linguistics and psychology. We would need research in order to 
determine the conditions under which people are willing to 
apply various mental predicates to other people, and further 
research to describe the sorts of predictive and explanatory 
inferences that people make on the basis of those applications. 
By hypothesis, we are able to use the theory of folk 
psychology to predict and explain the behavior of others, but we 
cannot make the same inferences by using any other method. 
Consequently, we can safely conclude that other people are 
functionally equivalent to beings with mental properties. 
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning alone will not get us to the 
conclusion we want: namely, that other people have mental 
properties, since, in general, functional equivalence is not 
sufficient for equality. We need to introduce some other 
principle. 
 We get the cleanest argument by accepting the 
functionalist hypothesis. If being functionally equivalent to a 
conscious entity is being a conscious entity, then the remainder 
of our proof comprises one line: People are functionally 
equivalent to beings with minds; ergo, they have minds. Thus 
the problem of other minds is solved. 
 
OBJECTION: What is „functionally equivalent‟? 
REPLY: I will distinguish between two definitions of functional 
equivalence. The first definition of equivalence defines two 
systems as functionally equivalent iff both can be adequately 
described using a functional description where the same causal 
relations hold between the functional states and the inputs and 
outputs of the system and the description of both systems make 
reference to the same set of inputs and outputs. I will term 
systems that are equivalent in this sense „I/O-equivalent.‟ 
Unfortunately, this definition of equivalence, when plugged into 
the functionalist thesis I give above, is apt to make functionalism 
parochial by denying mental states to entities that certainly have 
them.3 Consequently, I am led to accept another notion of 
equivalence in my definition. Two systems will be called A-
equivalent iff both can be adequately described using a 
functional description and the description of both systems where 
the same causal relations hold between the functional states and 
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the inputs and outputs of the system, but the inputs and outputs 
need not be the same for both systems. Thus A-equivalency is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for I/O-equivalency. The same 
terms can be applied to functional states using analogous 
definitions. The functionalist thesis I am pushing, then, is that to 
be conscious is to be A-equivalent (or nearly A-equivalent) to a 
system that is well-described using folk psychology. 
 
OBJECTION: If we can define having conscious states as being a 
certain type of functional system, then we will be able to find a 
functional characterization for every sufficiently complex system 
(the Atlantic Ocean, say) according to which it is conscious. And 
the fact of the matter is that the Atlantic Ocean is not conscious, 
no matter what functional characterization of its causal relations 
we attribute to it. Surely countenancing mental-state attributions 
of this kind is a reductio ad absurdum of functionalism! 
REPLY: Those who make this objection are right to point out 
that, on the face of it, attributing mental states to a system such 
as the Atlantic Ocean seems bizarre. In fact, virtually every 
speaker of English (with the exception of a handful of animists, 
philosophers, and cognitive scientists) would agree the claim is 
definitely false. In the face of such overwhelming agreement 
(and given my complete inability to produce any arguments in 
favor of the alternative position), I will concede the point that, 
given the way words like „conscious‟ are used in modern 
English, the claim I have been advancing is not true.4 
Nonetheless, I maintain, it is still the best solution to the problem 
of other minds. 
 What an absurdity, to attempt to solve a philosophical 
problem by embracing an abjectly false claim! Nonetheless, I will 
argue, the problem we face here is not a problem with 
functionalism, but with our customary way of speaking. 
Accepting liberalism would require a substantial alteration in the 
way we speak about mental properties (as it would attribute 
such properties to a vast number of entities to which we do not 
now attribute them), but, I will argue, there are good reasons to 
accept such a change in our customary manner of speaking, and 
no such reasons (aside from inertia) to preserve it. 
 So what are the advantages of redefining mental 
predicates in purely functional terms? Taking the intentional 
stance allows us to obtain a substantial amount of predictive and 
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explanatory power that is not (presently) available to us by any 
other means. The redefinition I am proposing would not remove 
any of this power from the intentional stance, and if embracing it 
leads to the sort of research program I outlined earlier, it might 
well expand it. Treating beliefs, goals, desires, and so on as 
purely functional states would not prohibit us from using the 
intentional stance to predict and explain the actions of others just 
as we always have, even to the point of enabling us to 
understand (as best we can) others‟ comments about the taste of 
buttered toast. 
 Furthermore, as Dennett is wont to point out, the 
predictive power of the intentional stance is a matter of objective 
fact. It follows that if the hypothesis (that the functionalist thesis 
I am pushing leads to massive liberalism) is true, then at least 
some properties of many systems can be described using the 
intentional stance. In the case of most systems, this fact is 
probably a mere curiosity – if there are patterns in the Atlantic 
Ocean that can be described using the intentional stance, they are 
probably of no real interest to us – but it is possible that we will 
one day discover systems that can be described in a useful way 
using categories with functional properties very similar to those 
of the intentional stance, so that a wide variety of their input/
output relations can be usefully described using the intentional 
stance. Such a possibility may sound fantastical, but the universe 
contains a great many complex systems. So a liberal ascription of 
conscious mental states may allow us to gain understanding, and 
we will lose no predictive or explanatory power that we already 
possess by adopting such a change of language. 
 
OBJECTION: Consider the famous „Absent Qualia Argument,‟ 
which has myriad variations, all of which essentially run like 
this: 
1) The functionalist hypothesis is that having mental states 
merely requires a certain sort of functional state. 
2) For any functional state, we can imagine a zombie that is in 
that functional state, but has no conscious, first-person, 
qualitative experience (i.e. has no qualia). 
3) Having qualia is intrinsic to at least some mental states. 
4) Therefore, a system need not be conscious merely in virtue of 
having certain functional states. 
REPLY: The argument made by many (e.g. Dennett 1991) who 
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wish to deny (4) involves denying both (2) and (3) by denying 
that qualia exist. Such arguments tend to depend on examples 
designed to spur intuitions, and I will shamelessly admit that I 
find most of the literature on this subject confused. I will 
therefore ignore this particular counter-counterargument in 
favor of a more roundabout approach. 
Consider that the question we are (ultimately) attempting 
to answer is „how do we know that other people are conscious?‟ 
We have already shown that the functional portion of the folk 
psychological theory of mind is the only portion of the theory of 
mind that does any work in predicting or explaining any 
observable phenomenon. If qualia are important to our story 
about the mind, then, the problem of other minds reduces to the 
question, „how do we know that other people really have qualia, 
rather than being unconscious zombies who fool us by virtue of 
being I/O-equivalent to conscious beings?‟ 
      And so we run into the problem: there is no way to 
distinguish between zombies and entities with qualia! There is 
not a shred of evidence (or any other kind) that I can point to to 
support the contention that George Bush has qualia, or to 
support the contention that he is a zombie. Consequently, if we 
demand that our notion of a mental state include having qualia, 
we are lead to the unfortunate conclusion that we do not know 
that other people are conscious! 
 
OBJECTION: In effect, what you are saying is that the problem 
of other minds would be solved if we meant something else by 
„minds‟, as your proposed recharacterization of consciousness 
removes the essential element – qualia! Two plus two would 
equal seven if we meant something different by „two,‟ too, but 
you can‟t prove „2 + 2 = 7‟ by redefining „2‟!”  
REPLY: A functionalist redefinition of „consciousness‟ will not be 
sufficient to solve the problem of other minds for those for whom 
the possession of consciousness requires ineffable, indescribable 
qualia. Since there is no way to demonstrate (or even provide 
evidence for) the proposition that other people have such qualia, 
it follows that the redefinition I am now proposing will not 
suffice as such a demonstration. 
 None of this need mean that talk of qualia (as 
distinguished from talk of „qualia‟) need vanish. Under my 
proposed program of redefinition, we can continue to talk about 
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immediate sensory impressions, feelings, and every other state 
that is supposed to be a qualia. The difference is that in a liberal 
theory, we will make such ascriptions to any system for which it 
is functionally appropriate. If we make a robot that simulates a 
human being, and it eats buttered toast, we need have no qualms 
talking about how the toast tastes to the robot, just as we have no 
qualms about discussing how toast tastes to other people. 
 
OBJECTION: You have shown that qualia are not necessary for 
any sort of scientific or everyday prediction or explanation, but 
there is more to life than prediction and explanation. That agents 
really have qualitative experience is important to many moral, 
aesthetic, and other types of value systems. Perhaps we can 
accept a language from which the idea of really having qualia 
has been expunged for the purpose of science, but it cannot be 
eliminated from value theory. 
REPLY: I have already demonstrated that, using the conception 
of qualia employed by people who make these sorts of 
objections, there are no grounds for believing that other people 
are real experiencers with real qualitative states, rather than 
being mere zombies. Consequently, a value system that bases its 
evaluations on the possession of qualia makes it impossible to 
determine whose experiences are actually deserving of 
consideration and whose are not. Such a system cannot be used 
in making evaluations, and I see no reason to keep our old habits 
of speech simply because they allow us to preserve the illusion 
that certain unemployable systems of valuation are employable. 
Those to whom these sorts of considerations are compelling may, 
if they wish, continue to demand that having qualia be a 
necessary condition for consciousness in their idiolects, as long 
as they admit that their ascriptions of qualia to others rests on a 
leap of faith. 
 
OBJECTION: John Searle offers an argument that suggests that 
other people do have qualitative mental states. I fear doing 
injustice to his argument by summarizing it, so I will simply 
quote him: 
 
If you think for a moment about how we know 
that dogs and cats are conscious, and that 
computers and cars are not conscious . . . you will 
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see that the basis of our certainty is not 
“behavior,” but rather a certain causal conception 
of how the world works. One can see that dogs 
and cats are in certain important respects 
relevantly similar to us. Those are eyes, this is 
skin, these are ears, etc. . . . behavior by itself is of 
no interest to us; it is rather the combination of 
behavior with the knowledge of the causal 
underpinnings of the behavior that form the basis of 
our knowledge. (Searle 1992 p.22) 
 
So the thesis that other people are conscious is perhaps not 
proven, but its prior probability is much higher than that of the 
thesis that other people are zombies. I can reason from my own 
knowledge of my own qualia (we will suppose for a moment 
that I have such knowledge), and my picture of the world as 
consisting of particles in fields of force that my qualia are caused 
by the particular particles and fields of force in my brain. Thus, I 
can reason that other entities with similar brains have similar 
qualitative experiences. 
REPLY: The problem with Searle‟s argument is that it rests on a 
seemingly dubious intuition about the sorts of brains that would 
produce qualitative mental states. As Dennett comments, 
“Perhaps left-handers [sic] brains, for instance, only mimic the 
control powers of brains that produce genuine Intentionality!”5 
(Dennett 1987 p. 334) Undoubtedly Searle would find Dennett‟s 
supposition preposterous, but I doubt he could succeed in giving 
any reasons why it was preposterous without begging the 
question. He could not begin an empirical investigation to show 
that both right and left-handers have the brain characteristics 
that produce genuine qualitative experiences: in order to make 
such a determination, he would need some independent test to 
distinguish zombies from real conscious beings. Since no such 
test exists, Searle is flat out of luck. 
 
OBJECTION: Your counter to Searle‟s response is just a crude 
form of anti-inductivist skepticism. We do not have any evidence 
that physical systems act as if there are electrons because 
electrons really exist, as opposed to the theory that physical 
systems act as they do because they are functionally equivalent 
to systems with electrons, but electrons are not real, but this does 
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not stop us from inferring (correctly) that electrons exist. Why 
hold qualia to a higher standard? 
REPLY: In physics the properties of electrons are limited to the 
properties that functionally connect them to other elements of 
the theory of physics. A demonstration that a physical system is 
(perfectly) I/O-equivalent to a system with electrons is a 
demonstration that the system has properties with all the 
characteristics we ascribe to electrons. Qualia, by contrast, are 
supposed to have characteristics above and beyond their 
functional relations, and there can be no evidence that entities 
with all the properties of qualia (e.g. “ineffability”), rather than 
just their functional properties, exist. 
 
OBJECTION: Block points out that there are many mentalistic 
categories whose conditions of application cannot be purely 
functional, because they require a certain type of relationship 
with the world. (Block 1978) For example, knowledge of some 
proposition p requires that p be true, and perception of some 
entity E requires that there actually be some E (if there is not, 
then the “perception” is a hallucination or mistake of some 
form). In general, propositional attitudes cannot be defined 
purely by A-equivalence, because having a propositional attitude 
requires some causal connection to the content expressed in the 
proposition. For example, in Hilary Putnam‟s Twin Earth 
example (Putnam 1973), the states of the Earthling who believes 
water is wet and the Twin Earthling who believes XYZ is wet are 
A-equivalent (or almost A-equivalent), but they are not both the 
belief that water is wet. One is causally connected to water; the 
other is causally connected to XYZ. 
REPLY: Insofar as the application of mental predicates requires 
that some proposition not about the person be true, I am inclined 
to grant the objection, but it is no serious blow to the theory I am 
proposing to grant that some mental states are contingent on the 
facts of the world. We can always separate out the functionally 
relevant characteristics of the mental state (e.g. the belief that 
water is wet, as opposed to knowledge that water is wet) in order 
to predict and explain behavior, so there is no real problem. 
 The objection dealing with the connection of 
propositional attitudes to the propositions the attitudes are about 
is more significant. One way around the problem would be to 
accept that both the Earthling and the Twin Earthling do believe 
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the same thing, but that would be perverse at best: one of the 
reasons I gave for accepting this recharacterization of our 
intentional vocabulary was that it would allow us to continue 
using folk psychology as it applies to ordinary people without 
any alteration. The correct response, I believe, is to deny that 
functional states that are (almost) A-equivalent are necessarily 
the same mental state. So the beliefs of the Earthling and the 
Twin Earthling are A-equivalent, but they are not the same 
belief. 
 This point suggests that we need some sort of 
characterization of what the identity criteria for mental states are, 
since A-equivalence is insufficient. My proposal would be that 
the development/discovery of such criteria would be part of the 
job of the research program I outlined earlier. Finding criteria 
that both conformed to our intuitions about mental states (at 
least when applied to the case of other people) and were useful 
for science would be an important goal of such a program. 
 Luckily, our ability to apply the intentional stance need 
not wait for such a program to achieve success. We can describe 
the behavior of other people in intentional terms without it. 
Furthermore, we have a test for determining that entities we find 
in the world are conscious: if their behavior is well described in a 
wide variety of situations using folk psychology, then they are 
conscious. Since other people pass the test, they are conscious, 
and the problem of other minds is solved. 
 I have proposed a redefinition of the language we use to 
describe mental life. This language would redefine our mental 
terms so that the functional relations between them were 
preserved, but would concede that these terms can be applied to 
any system in which the same functional relations hold. All the 
predictive and explanatory power of the intentional language we 
use now would be preserved, although many important 
questions would be left to future researchers. The problem of 
other minds would be solved (since we know that other peoples‟ 
behavior is well-described using the categories of folk 
psychology) at the “price” of conceding that at least some things 
which most speakers of modern English would not call conscious 
are conscious. The notion of „qualia‟ as “ineffable” or 
“indescribable” would vanish from the theory of mind, not 
because qualia have been shown not to exist, but simply because 
such talk lacks any predictive or explanatory value. Some 
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philosophers will complain that theories generated using this 
language will fail to explain why people have conscious 
experiences, and, given their notion of „conscious experiences,‟ 
they will be correct. But an inability to explain a „fact‟ that we 
can‟t evidence and don‟t need to predict or explain anything is of 
little concern to me. 
 
Notes 
1 Undoubtedly many philosophers will think this assertion is far too weak and 
would prefer that I make some stronger claim. But I think very few (except 
perhaps the Churchlands) will be inclined to doubt it. 
2 I am not introducing the supposition that folk psychology is only a theory of 
the behavior of other people, but merely asserting that it is at least such a 
theory. 
3 For an explication and defense of this point, see Block (1978). 
4 Discussions with Benjamin George have convinced me that I am probably 
conceding too much by granting that functionalism is not true given modern 
English usage. But since my contention would only be strengthened if my thesis 
were true (or if its truth-value were ambiguous), I will grant the point anyway. 
5 Dennett is talking about Intentionality, but the same point can be made about 
qualia. 
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